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EARNINGS BENCHMARKS AND TIMELINESS OF AUDIT REPORTS: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM AS MODERATING VARIABLE 
 
Antonius Herusetya 




This study examines the relationship the tendency of management to meet earnings targets 
(earnings benchmarks) and the timeliness of audit reports. The timeliness of audit reports is 
measured by the number of days from the date of fiscal year-end of the financial statements 
until the date of the audit report. While the tendency to meet the earnings target is measured 
using a tendency to report a slight of net income and little change in earnings compared with 
previous year. This study also examines the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
through the role of board of directors and audit committees in relation to earnings 
management’s tendency to meet earnings targets and the timeliness of audit reports. Using 
419 firm-years observation of manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) during the period of 2009-2014, as well as using multiple regression, these studies did 
not find evidence that earnings management using a tendency to meet earnings targets affect 
the timeliness of audit report. However, by using 300 firm-years observation from 
manufacturing industry listed on IDX  for the year 2010-2014, I found weak evidence that 
corporate governance mechanism through the role of board of commissioners and audit 
committee have a moderating role that weaken the positive relationship between the tendency 
to meet earnings targets with the timeliness of the audit report. 
Keywords: earnings benchmarks, audit report timeliness, corporate governance, board of 
commissioner, audit committee 
JEL Classification: M42 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Past researches have documented that change in environment of financial statements 
and audit lead to a longer or reduced number of days in audit time (Whitworth & Lambert, 
2014; Mitra et al., 2015; Pizinni et al., 2015; OJK, 2014). The number of days required to 
complete audited financial statements, i.e., audit delay will increase significantly with the 
implementation Section 404 of the SOX Act in 2002 (Pizinni et al., 2015; Ettredge et al., 
2006). On the other hands, the presence of high quality internal audit section, as well as the 
implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 for public listed companies introduced by the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in 2007, researchers found that the 
audit process become more efficient and more timely, and reduces the audit report lag 
(Pizinni et al., 2015; Mitra et al, 2015). Other researchers found evidence that audit quality as 
measured by office-specific industry expertise negatively associated with audit delay, while 
the higher interests on client positively associated with audit delay (Whitworth & Lambert, 
2014). With the increase in audit report lag, others also found evidence the increased 
restatement of audited financial statements (Blankley et al., 2015). 
 Longer days in the timeliness of audit report is suspected to lead less relevant 
information to the capital market, and thus give indications of red flags and lower earnings 
quality (Blankley et al., 2015; 2014). This low earnings quality can be caused partly by the 
problem of earnings management, restatement of financial statements, and deficiency of 
internal control (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
 Previous researchers also found that there is a tendency for managers to manage 
earnings to meet earnings targets (Graham et al., 2005; Brown & Caylor, 2005; Burgstahler 
& Dichev, 1997). Managers might engage in earnings management by focusing to achieve 
earnings target by avoiding to report loss or little change in income compared with the 
previous year (Graham et al., 2005) thus reflect bad business decisions (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997). External auditors then need a longer time in audit process and in detecting 
earnings management conducted by the management that affect the timeliness of audit reports 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Blankley et al., 2015; 2014). Ettredge et al., (2006) for example, found 
that the material weakness in internal control over financial reporting associated with longer 
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audit delay. Our study investigate the association between the tendency to meet earnings 
benchmarks as a tool of earnings management and the timeliness of audit report.  
 Board of commissioners and audit committee as an institution that runs the 
mechanisms of corporate governance have role in controlling the financial reporting process 
and the audit of it so as to reduce the audit delay (Nor et al., 2010; Caramanis & Lennox, 
2008). Our study investigate the moderating role of board of commissioners and audit 
committee in the association between the tendency of management to meet earnings 
benchmarks and the timeliness of audit report.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Tendency to Meet Earnings Target and Audit Report Timeliness 
 The achievement of earnings targets used as indicators to evaluate the performance of 
the entity for public listed companies, thereby reducing the cost of processing information 
(Graham et al., 2005). And investors prefer to invest in companies that meet or exceed the 
target as a reference point, so as to give a higher valuation, whichever is the company has a 
better performance compared to other companies (Kahnerman & Tversky, 1979). 
 Results of previous studies documented their increasing tendency that the 
management of public companies manage earnings to meet earnings targets (e.g., Graham et 
al., 2005; Rees, 2005). Motivation to meet earnings targets indicates that the earnings quality 
is low (Dechow and Schrand, 2004; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). This indicates also that there is 
a problem in their internal control, i.e., for example the issues of management integrity as a 
part of the control environment (Arens et al., 2015). 
 Therefore, auditors are dealing with internal control in audit of financial statements, 
and auditors are likely to have longer audit time in a company problematic internal controls 
(e.g., Caramanis & Lennox, 2008; Brankley et al., 2014; 2015). We conclude that a tendency 
to meet earnings target is expected to increase audit report lag. Thus our hypothesis to be 
tested is formulated as follows: 
H1: The tendency to meet earnings targets positively effects audit report lag. 
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Corporate Governance Mechanism, Earnings Benchmarks, and Audit Report 
Timeliness 
 Prior studies have documented the relationship of corporate governance with financial 
statement information (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Several studies have examined the 
association where the audit committee with the quality of financial statements (e.g., Beasley, 
1996; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991). Other studies examined the activities and mechanisms of 
corporate governance with the quality of financial statements (e.g., Xie et al., 2003). 
 Corporate governance mechanisms have a function in the supervision of internal 
financial reports and can improve the quality of earnings. Studies in Indonesia, Hermawan 
(2011) for example, found that if the board of commissioners carry out their functions 
effectively, the earning response coefficients will be higher. This indicates that the earnings 
quality is increasingly high. Corporate governance mechanisms through the function of the 
board of commissioners and audit committee can help the process of monitoring the financial 
reporting independently, and further enhance the quality of financial reporting, and thus 
reduce the work of the external auditor and audit report lag. 
 Based on these reasons, our hypotheses to be tested in this study was formulated as 
follows: 
H2: Corporate governance mechanism through board of commissioners and audit committee 
weakens (strengthen) the positive (negative) association between earnings benchmarks and 




Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 Population in this study are listed companies in manufacturing industry in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (BEI). We used purposive sample selection method with a criteria as 
follows: (i) The sample are companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange with the 
observation period of 2009-2014; and (ii)The companies have audited financial statements 
with the fiscal period ended on December 31, and complete annual report. 
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 This study uses secondary data of the financial data derived from the company's 
financial statements published by the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), as well as on the 
company home page or BEI. Non-financial data source for audit committee and board of 
commissioners are from the annual report for the calculation of scores Board of 
Commissioners and the Audit Committee. 
 
Empirical Model and Measurement of Variables 
 
Empirical Model to test the hypothesis H1 
 We use two empirical model to test hypothesis H1 as follows: 
 
ARLit = α0 + α1 MBEit + α2 BIG4it + α3 OPINIit + α4 ROAit + α5 LEVit  
                          + α6 SIZEit + eit ……………………………………………………... Model 1 
ARL it = β0 + β1 DMBEit + β2 BIG4it + β3 OPINIit + β4 ROAit + β5 LEVit  
                 + β6 SIZEit + eit …………………………………………………….. Model 2 
  
The main variable in Model 1 is MBE (Small Earnings Level) that measures the tendency to 
meet earnings targets, i.e., a small earnings target. Coefficient α1 is predicted positive and 
significant, indicating that the tendency to meet or slightly exceed its earnings target will 
positively influence audit report lag (ARL). MBE is a dummy variable (1; 0), following 
Yulianti (2004) and Frankel et al. (2002), given 1 if net income scaled by total assets is in the 
interval of 0.00 and 0.02, and 0 if others. While ARl is the number of days from the date of 
the financial statements based on the fiscal year until the date of audit report (Blankley et al., 
2015; Kneckel & Payne, 2001). 
 While on Model 2, the main variable is DMBE (Small Earnings Increase), which is 
the tendency to meet earnings targets measured by a tendency to meet or exceed little 
changes in earnings compared with the previous year, and predicted coefficient DMBE (β1) 
is positive and significant. DMBE is a dummy variable (1; 0), following Yulianti (2004) and 
Frankel et al. (2002), given 1, if the change in net income scaled by total assets is in the 
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interval of 0.00 to 0.01, and 0 if other. We use control variables in Model 1 and Model 2 i.e., 
BIG4, OPINION, ROA, LEV, SIZE based on the previous studies. 
 
Empirical Model to test the hypothesis H2 
 We use two models to test hypothesis H2 as follows: 
 
ARL it = δ0+ δ1 MBEit + δ2 DK + + δ3 KA + δ4 MBE*DKit + δ5 MBE*KAit + δ6 BIG4it  
                     + δ7 OPINIit + δ8 ROAit + δ9 LEVit + δ10 SIZEit + eit …………….... Model 3 
ARL it = λ0 + λ1 DMBEit + λ2 DK + + λ3 KA + λ4 DMBE*DKit + λ5 DMBE*KAit  
                    + λ6 BIG4it  + λ7 OPINIit + λ8 ROAit + λ9 LEVit + λ10 SIZEit + eit ….. Model 4 
 
 In Model 3, our main variable is MBE*DK and MBE* KA with coefficient δ4 and δ5 
is predicted negative and significant. This indicates that the Board of Commissioners and the 
Audit Committee to perform effectively in the internal control of financial reporting, giving 
the effect to weaken (strengthen) the positive (negative) tendency to meet earnings targets as 
measured by MBE. 
 In Model 4, the main variable is DMBE*DK and DMBE*KA, with coefficient λ4 and 
λ5 is predicted negative and significant. In Model 3 and Model 4 also included some control 
variables, because these variables did influence variable ARL directly as with previous 
empirical models. 
 
Measurement of Board of Commissioners (DK) and Audit Committee (KA) 
 Our measurement of the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners (DK) and the 
Audit Committee (KA) follow Hermawan (2011). She used content analysis using the criteria 
from the Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD). There are three possible 
assessment in each question in the lists both for DK and KA: Good, Fair and Poor. The value 
set for Good, Fair, and Poor is 3, 2, and 1 respectively. If the total score of DK equals and 
more than 34, we give the value of 1, and 0 for others. And if the total score of KA equal and 
more than 22, we give the value of 1, and 0 for other. Please see the computation for details 
in Hermawan (2011).  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistics for Model 1 and 3 in Table 1 shows the standard deviation is 
relatively small, except for the variable ARL, so it can be concluded that the distribution of 
the variables studied are homogeneous. Mean ARL indicates that the average completion 
time for is 79 days. MBE, as a measure of earnings management has mean of 0.19, indicating 
that the proportion of listed companies to meet earnings targets (MBE) is around 19 percent. 
Variable DK has mean of 34.17 indicates that the number of firm-years observation has a 
score that indicates the board of commissioners function relatively effective, because the 
threshold score is 34 or higher (Hermawan, 2011). Mean of KA is 25.05, above the threshold 
of 22 indicates that the audit committee from the observations function effectively.  
 Descriptive statistics for Model 2 and Model 4 is presented in Table 2 also shows the 
standard deviation is relatively small for 300 firm-years of observation. Mean of ARL is 79 
days, with a minimum of 33 days and a maximum amount of 177 days. The mean of DK is 
34.23, and mean score of the audit committee (KA) is also above the minimum threshold of 
22, i.e., 24.91. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results H1 
 Hypothesis testing results of H1 contained in Tables 3 and 4, each of which is the 
result of testing the hypothesis H1 using Model 1 and Model 2. Results of hypothesis testing 
using Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the test specifications of the model as a whole have low 
R-squared 3.94 percent, but significant at the 0.01 level (F-test = 5.35). MBE coefficient is 
not significant at 0.10 (α1 = 1.21, t-test = 0.52). These test results have not found evidence 
that the tendency to meet earnings targets by reporting a small earnings (MBE) is not 
associated with the length of time reporting of audits conducted by auditors. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables - Model 1 and Model 3 
        Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         arl |       419    78.68019    17.54251         31        177 
         mbe |       419    .1861575     .389699          0          1 
          dk |       419    34.16706    3.677263         26         43 
          ka |       419    25.04773    4.555623         11         32 
        big4 |       419    .3627685    .4813736          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       opini |       419     .928401    .2581311          0          1 
         roa |       419    .0749936    .1433222     -.7753      .8617 
         lev |       419    .5256138    .3597631          0     1.9494 
        size |       419    27.85609    1.740151    19.7793    35.3976 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables - Model 2 and Model 4 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         arl |       300    78.55667    16.94927         33        177 
        dmbe |       300    .1933333    .3955719          0          1 
          dk |       300       34.23    3.580479         26         43 
          ka |       300    24.91333    4.587225         11         32 
        big4 |       300         .36     .480802          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       opini |       300         .93    .2555733          0          1 
         roa |       300    .0674613    .1433573     -.7753      .6701 
         lev |       300    .4839927    .2714795          0     1.8652 
        size |       300    27.89382    1.821189    19.7793    35.3976 
 
 Results of hypothesis testing H1 in Model 2 using the tendency to meet earnings 
targets measured by reporting little changes in earnings (DMBE) can be seen in Table 4. 
Model 2 has R-squared 3.36 percent with F-test 3.63, significant at 0.01 level. The main 
variables DMBE has a coefficient β2 = 2,896, not significant at 0.10 against the ARL, 
consistent with the results from Model 1. In other words, we found no evidence that the 
tendency to report little change in net income (DMBE) have any association with the length 
of time the audit (ARL). In summary, the testing results of hypothesis H1 using Model 1 and 
2 showed no evidence that earnings management tools using earnings benchmarks either by 
reporting a small profit, and little change in profit have no association with the length of audit 
time. Thus the hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
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Table 3. Testing Result of Hypothesis H1 – Model 1 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     419 
                                                       F(  6,   412) =    5.35 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0394 
                                                       Root MSE      =  17.318 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         arl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         mbe |   1.209666   2.348508     0.52   0.607    -3.406887    5.826218 
        big4 |  -1.304337   2.209657    -0.59   0.555    -5.647946    3.039271 
       opini |  -3.044223   2.792512    -1.09   0.276    -8.533572    2.445125 
         roa |  -11.66365   4.999367    -2.33   0.020     -21.4911   -1.836199 
         lev |   4.654872   2.250449     2.07   0.039     .2310766    9.078667 
        lnta |  -.1771328   .5704912    -0.31   0.756    -1.298569    .9443038 
       _cons |   85.11669   15.77088     5.40   0.000     54.11527    116.1181 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Output from Stata Software 
 
Table 4. Testing Result of Hypothesis H1 – Model 2 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F(  6,   293) =    3.63 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0017 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0376 
                                                       Root MSE      =  16.797 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         arl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        dmbe |   2.896245   2.913628     0.99   0.321    -2.838048    8.630538 
        big4 |  -.6796036   2.778836    -0.24   0.807    -6.148612    4.789405 
       opini |  -4.308813   2.572249    -1.68   0.095     -9.37124    .7536134 
         roa |  -9.548456   5.639877    -1.69   0.092    -20.64826    1.551349 
         lev |   4.576185   2.885615     1.59   0.114    -1.102975    10.25535 
        lnta |  -.3990594   .6473169    -0.62   0.538    -1.673039    .8749207 
       _cons |   91.80918    17.0491     5.38   0.000     58.25495    125.3634 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Output from Stata Software 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results H2 
 The test results on the hypothesis H2 are shown in Table 5 using Model 3, and Table 
6 using Model 4. The test results in Model 3 shows that the model specification test results as 
a whole have R-squared of 4.84 percent and F-test 3.73, significant at 0.01 level. The main 
variables in this test, both MBE*DK and MBE*KA are not significant at the level of 0.10. 
This test shows no evidence that the effectiveness of the board of commissioners and audit 
committee effectiveness have any moderating role in their association between the tendency 
to meet earnings targets by reporting little profit (MBE) and the length of audit time. 
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Table 5.  Testing Results of Hypothesis H2 – Model 3  
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     419 
                                                       F( 10,   408) =    3.73 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0001 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0484 
                                                       Root MSE      =  17.321 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         arl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         mbe |    .588649   14.70446     0.04   0.968    -28.31732    29.49462 
          dk |  -.3843974   .3199517    -1.20   0.230    -1.013357    .2445622 
          ka |  -.0371064    .207575    -0.18   0.858    -.4451563    .3709435 
      mbexdk |  -.3578355    .501399    -0.71   0.476    -1.343483    .6278124 
      mbexka |   .5192951   .4479487     1.16   0.247    -.3612803    1.399871 
        big4 |  -1.207109   2.385879    -0.51   0.613    -5.897259    3.483041 
       opini |  -3.968105   2.768356    -1.43   0.153    -9.410127    1.473917 
         roa |  -10.25272   4.845855    -2.12   0.035    -19.77868   -.7267628 
         lev |   3.641524   2.437361     1.49   0.136    -1.149829    8.432876 
        size |   .1188805   .5345135     0.22   0.824    -.9318636    1.169625 
       _cons |   92.29898    19.5545     4.72   0.000     53.85883    130.7391 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Output from Stata Software 
 
Table 6.  Testing Results of Hypothesis H2 – Model 4  
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F( 10,   289) =    4.51 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1180 
                                                       Root MSE      =  16.191 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         arl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        dmbe |   65.09352   15.41295     4.22   0.000     34.75766    95.42939 
          dk |  -.1684417   .2673467    -0.63   0.529    -.6946352    .3577517 
          ka |   .2542538   .2348197     1.08   0.280    -.2079199    .7164275 
     dmbexdk |  -.0226641   .0612109    -0.37   0.711    -.1431398    .0978116 
     dmbexka |  -2.532932   .6066871    -4.18   0.000    -3.727018   -1.338847 
        big4 |  -.3794609   2.934205    -0.13   0.897    -6.154582     5.39566 
       opini |   -2.64739   2.785407    -0.95   0.343    -8.129646    2.834866 
         roa |  -8.400742    5.55033    -1.51   0.131    -19.32494    2.523453 
         lev |   1.708185   2.741044     0.62   0.534    -3.686755    7.103126 
        size |  -.4346896   .6293146    -0.69   0.490    -1.673311    .8039315 
       _cons |   79.86721   21.69293     3.68   0.000     37.17104    122.5634 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Output from Stata Software 
 
 The test results using interaction variables DMBE*DK and DMBE*KA using Model 
4 are presented in Table 6. DMBE interaction variables, DMBE*DK and DMBE*KA 
indicates whether the board of commissioners and audit committee have a moderating role in 
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the relationship between the tendency to report a little change in reporting earnings (DMBE) 
and the length of audit time (ARL). The test results in Table 6 shows that the model 
specifications have R-squared of 11.80 percent with a value of 4.51 F-test, significant at the 
0.01 level. DMBE variables are positive and significant at 0.01 level, while the variable 
DMBE*KA negative and significant at 0.01 level. While the interaction variables 
DMBE*DK is not significant at 0.10. The test results on the Model 4 indicates the role of the 
audit committee (KA) as a moderating variable that weaken the relationship between the 
tendency to report little change in reported earnings (DMBE) and the timeliness of audit 
report (ARL). 
 In conclusion, from the H2 hypothesis testing using Model 3 and Model 4, we found 
some evidence that the mechanism of corporate governance through audit committee could 
weaken the positive relationship between earnings management using earnings benchmarks 
and the timeliness of audit report. Thus the hypothesis H2 can be accepted. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This study examines the association of earnings management through earnings 
benchmarks, either by reporting little earnings and reporting little changes in net income to 
the timeliness of the audit reports. This study also examines the role of the corporate 
governance mechanism through the role of board of commissioners and audit committee as 
moderating role in the association between the tendency to meet earnings targets and the 
timeliness of audit report. 
 By using the 419 firm-years observations from listed companies in the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange in the year 2009-2014 and using linear multiple regression, we found no 
evidence that earnings management through a tendency to meet earnings target has any 
associations with audit report lag or the timeliness of audit report. Furthermore, this study 
using 300 firm-years of data observation from 2010 to 2014, found some evidence that the 
corporate governance mechanisms using board of commissioners and audit committee have a 
moderating role that weaken the positive relationship between the tendency to meet earnings 
targets and the length of days of audit reports. 
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 The study found only some evidence regarding the role of audit committees in the 
corporate governance mechanisms. Hermawan (2011) found that when the role of board of 
commissioners is weak, the role of the audit committee will be much more involved. Further 
study must consider what kind of significant audit committee roles that give more impact in 
the moderating role in this association. Further study must also consider other kind of 
earnings management tools that board of commissioners and audit committee can minimize 
this tools and behavior.  
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